War and diplomacy during and after the AlAqsa Flood
War and diplomacy during and after the Al-Aqsa Flood
BEIRUT - Diplomacy during times of war differs significantly from diplomacy during periods of relative calm. This is particularly true when the negotiating parties fundamentally differ in their goals and have different standards. With an enemy that achieves their goals through striking fear, one cannot rely on their goodwill, nor waste available opportunities in the hope of a mirage.
History demonstrates that the trap of diplomacy has often led to setbacks for resistance movements. Delays and misplaced trust in promises from a deceitful enemy have resulted in strategic losses, particularly when officials believed in diplomatic assurances that later proved false. Understanding the true nature of the enemy is critical for success in war.
So far, independence and refusal to compromise by the resistance movement have been key to its achievements. Iran stands out as a model in its defensive and deterrence strategy. Its strength lies in its ability to fortify itself effectively, guided by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution’s directives.
Calculations are necessary within the scope of opportunities available. For example, delaying the response to the assassination of the resistance leader in Gaza was interpreted by the enemy as a sign of weakness. This led to further escalation, including subsequent assassinations in Lebanon and an intensified pace of massacres in Gaza and Lebanon.
The most effective supporting fronts during this year’s long battle have been those most steadfast in their resolve, refusing to be deceived. Yemen remains unique in maintaining an unwavering stance since October 8, positioning itself as a model of resilience. Similarly, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, particularly under the leadership of its martyr Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, demonstrated remarkable resolve. It successfully instilled fear in the occupying entity. Gaza, through continuing resistance, has shown signs of effective resilience.
However, Iraq has not fulfilled its potential as Syria did under Assad. Syria’s dependence on Arab nations that offered false promises, along with an overestimation of Russia’s capacity amidst the Ukraine war, left it vulnerable. Additionally, Syria’s request for a more limited Iranian role left it more vulnerable during the time of need. These experiences underscore the dangers of misplaced trust in diplomacy and the need for resistance movements to activate their front decisively and at the right time.
The expansion of resistance fronts depends on the model of strategic patience and the accumulation of crimes that ignite popular outrage, creating the conditions for mobilization. Resistance cannot afford to wait until its enemy decides to strike.
In the aftermath of the current war, Gaza will require years to recover and confront the machinery of anti-resistance diplomacy. Similarly, Lebanon's leadership appears to be focused on internal consolidation, while Iraq still tries to escape the dominance of the dollar. Yemen stands firm, rejecting all forms of diplomacy with its enemy. This resilience will likely provoke an intense Western campaign, but Yemen has demonstrated its ability to understand the language of its enemy and to respond effectively.
It can be concluded that understanding the Leader's vision requires three key methodologies:
1. An effective detailed strategy capable of activating and influencing the transformations within the Muslim nations following the Al-Aqsa Flood battle.
2. Efficiency in execution, which entails adherence to principles, seizing opportunities without hesitation, and relying on a vision where the competence of individuals is proven through its implementation.
3. Comprehensive coordination among the various fronts of resistance to ensure unity and strategic alignment.
In the current fronts of confrontation, the resistance must harness the spirit created by the Gaza genocide to pivot toward new fronts that may fall outside the current scope of the struggle. These alternative fronts hold the potential for exerting pressure and rallying popular support in unexpected ways, particularly in regions where Western powers are deeply invested in maintaining stability.
Whilst the Axis of Resistance is no longer in its previous form after it was hit at its joint, it can encompass an even bigger area, because the events in the past 14 months have nurtured the idea of resistance in the Islamic Ummah.
source: tehrantimes.com