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Tehrans regional doctrine weathering storms and hardships

· 5 min read

Tehran's regional doctrine: weathering storms and hardships

TEHRAN – Since Hamas launched its surprise offensive against Israel in October 2023, the face of West Asia has been changing. The operation brought the Palestinian cause back to the forefront of media coverage and became a key topic of discussion in elite circles. Although the "two-state solution" remains a distant prospect, it has gained renewed public support in the West as a potential resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Tehran's regional doctrine: weathering storms and hardships

In a recent article for The Hill, Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet argue that "Iran's nuclear phoenix may yet rise from the ashes of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria." However, their argument is unsupported by the facts on the ground. The authors' suggestion that Iran has been completely defeated by Israel in the region is inaccurate.

Since October 2023, Israel has targeted Hezbollah facilities and fighters across Lebanon, without significant success. Hezbollah operations continued in northern occupied Palestine and even into Haifa and Tel Aviv until a ceasefire took effect last month. Israel's operations in southern Lebanon failed to gain significant territory, and Hezbollah successfully repelled those attacks. The Lebanon ceasefire, largely mirroring UN Resolution 1701, offers no substantial changes. Hezbollah retains its weaponry and maintains its capacity to resume operations against Israel at any time.

In Gaza, Israel appears to lack a clear plan, and occupying the territory and building settlements is not a viable option due to several factors, including international pressure. The Israeli Prime Minister has actively blocked ceasefire efforts, a move viewed by many as an attempt to evade legal challenges he faces. Furthermore, installing the Palestinian Authority as Gaza's governing body is impractical; the PA lacks popular support and is unlikely to govern effectively without Hamas's cooperation.

While the fall of the Assad government in Syria was undoubtedly a setback for the Resistance Axis, it was not catastrophic. The Axis was not solely dependent on Syria; Hezbollah was a significant force long before Damascus became a logistical hub, and Ansarullah in Yemen demonstrates the viability of independent resistance movements. The country has been under siege by the Saudi-led coalition, however, it managed to foil attempts to overthrow the government in Sana’a. Yemenis have been launching attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waters against U.S.-Israeli interests. It has also launched missiles and drones on occupied Palestine successfully despite being constantly under attack by a U.S.-led coalition.

Toth and Sweet suggest Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; however, Tehran's continued cooperation with the IAEA and adherence to the NPT render these comments irrelevant.

Iran's actions were reactive measures taken in response to escalations against the country. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA initiated Tehran's retaliatory measures, which included a gradual increase in uranium enrichment. 

Moreover, even if Israel could destroy Iranian nuclear sites, such an attack would eliminate any basis for negotiations and leave Iran's existing expertise intact. Furthermore, such an operation might trigger further escalation, potentially including attacks on U.S. military sites in the region.

The authors criticize the previous U.S. administration for its perceived leniency toward Iran and praise Israel's decision to launch large-scale attacks on Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, despite the significant loss of life. They claim Iran received $10 billion due to sanctions relief; however, the fact is that the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy, continued under Biden, proved ineffective. Biden's administration attempted to pressure Iran back to the negotiating table, but these efforts have so far failed.

Toth and Sweet defend Israeli actions in West Asia and portray Iran negatively; however, the reality on the ground is far different. The Israeli war on Gaza has resulted in over 45,000 Palestinian deaths, mostly women and children, over 107,000 injuries, and thousands unaccounted for. A similar situation, though less severe, occurred in Lebanon and cannot be described as "self-defense." Israel has also repeatedly attacked Syrian infrastructure since the fall of the government and occupies parts of Syria, seemingly intending a permanent presence, in violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement.

Iran’s ties with Russia and China have been growing throughout recent years yet, it can’t be called a “strategic partnership” due to several factors. 

Iran and Russia share interests on several issues. For example, while their ultimate goals differ, their presence in Syria and the fight against terrorism represent a shared objective. Moscow sought to maintain air and naval bases, while Iran aimed to protect Shia holy shrines and establish a new supply route to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Despite the article's claims, these factors do not indicate Russia's willingness to provide Iran with nuclear detonation technology. Moscow has historically been cautious about Iran's nuclear program, even supporting anti-Iran resolutions in the UN Security Council and elsewhere.

Similarly, China's economic interests in West Asia facilitated the normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
 

source: tehrantimes.com