Security complex anew Irans venture into a new architecture
Security complex anew: Iran's venture into a new architecture
QOM - The war that began with the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran has done more than destroy military targets and redraw the map of immediate threats. It has exposed the fragility of the security architecture that has governed the Middle East for decades.
The old order built around American military presence, Israeli military superiority, and the political alignment of several Arab states with Washington has lost much of its previous certainty. A new regional security complex is therefore emerging which is unmistakably different from the order that existed before the war and is particularly promising for Iran.
The central question for Tehran is no longer simply whether it can resist the pressure but whether Iran can transform the strategic consequences of that resistance into a durable regional order that better serves its national interests. Thus, a new security complex is viable in light of the following dimensions:
The most important transformation concerns the distribution of power. For decades, the Persian Gulf security system operated largely within an American-centered structure. Arab governments depended heavily on American military power, American bases constituted the backbone of deterrence, and Israel functioned as Washington's principal regional military partner. Even when Arab states disagreed with Washington, they generally operated within the limits of this security architecture.
The war has challenged this assumption. Iran demonstrated that American military installations in the region are proved liabilities rather than security guarantees. The very bases intended to protect the Persian Gulf states turned them into potential targets. Iran's retaliation reached Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan, and other locations hosting U.S. military assets. This meant something consequential: the political value of American protection has radically become less certain.
The Persian Gulf states are therefore looking for greater strategic autonomy. Pakistan and Turkey become more important as alternative security partners, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states increasingly calculate their security according to their own national interests rather than simply according to Washington's regional preferences. This means the emergence of a more competitive and multipolar regional structure. For Iran, this is an opportunity, but only if Tehran understands that multi-polarity requires diplomacy as much as military power.
The second transformation concerns proximity. One of the principal assumptions of the previous security order was that the United States could project overwhelming power into Iran's immediate neighborhood. The war has complicated that assumption.
In the Caucasus, the strategic environment surrounding Iran appears less threatening than it did before the conflict. Turkey has demonstrated greater caution than a straightforward alignment with the U.S.-Israeli camp would have suggested, while Azerbaijan's relationship with Israel has become considerably more sensitive in the new environment.
This matters because Iran's security dilemma has historically been multidirectional. Tehran has had to watch the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the Levant, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus simultaneously. A reduction in immediate pressure along one of these fronts creates strategic breathing space.
Iran should therefore resist the temptation to treat the Caucasus merely as another battlefield of confrontation. The opportunity is to convert this reduced threat environment into a diplomatic belt of stability around its northern frontier.
Perhaps the most profound change is not military but conceptual. Before the war, regional competition was heavily organized around political influence, ideological rivalry, Iran's regional networks, the Yemen conflict, and the struggle over leadership in the Muslim world. The war has elevated another issue above many of these concerns, i.e., economic survival. For Saudi Arabia, the security of oil infrastructure, maritime routes, investment, Vision 2030, and economic diversification has become inseparable from national security. The closure and disruption of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated precisely how vulnerable an economic transformation strategy could be when regional military competition threatens energy infrastructure and maritime trade.
This creates an unexpected opening for Iran. Iran does not need Saudi Arabia to become its ally. It needs Saudi Arabia to recognize that permanent confrontation with Iran is incompatible with Saudi economic ambitions. This distinction is crucial. A Saudi Arabia primarily concerned with protecting its economy is a Saudi Arabia with incentives to negotiate with Tehran.
The same logic helps explain the growing divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Their differences over Yemen, oil policy, Israel, and regional security have become increasingly visible, demonstrating that the Persian Gulf is not a single strategic actor. Iran's opportunity is therefore not to divide the Persian Gulf through confrontation, but to encourage a regional security logic in which economic interdependence becomes more valuable than permanent military alignment with Washington.
The war has also altered the region's patterns of amity and enmity. At the governmental level, Iran's attacks on Arab territories hosting U.S. military assets generated anger and divergence. Tehran does not ignore this reality because any attempt to build a new security order while disregarding Arab perceptions would be strategically wrong. Iran's diplomatic endeavor amid the conflict showed its regional concern and responsibility for neighbors. Nevertheless, another process has occurred at the societal level. Iran's direct military resistance to the United States and Israel has changed perceptions among segments of Arab and Muslim public opinion.
Whatever their governments' disagreements with Tehran, many communities interpreted Iran's resistance as evidence that American and Israeli dominance over Muslims is far from correct. This creates an important ideational opportunity for Iran. The Axis of Resistance may have suffered organizational and material setbacks, particularly in Lebanon, but the broader idea of resistance has not necessarily weakened. Indeed, the war has strengthened its symbolic appeal among populations that view the existing regional order as dominated by external powers. If Tehran wants Arab governments to accept a new regional balance, it must translate the core idea of resistance into the broader proposition of regional sovereignty, strategic autonomy, economic security, and freedom from external domination. That would be much easier for Arab states to embrace.
The military balance also presents Iran with both opportunities and challenges. The war demonstrated that Iran possesses considerable capabilities for imposing costs on U.S. regional assets and disrupting the assumptions underlying the existing security architecture. At the same time, the conflict exposed some Iranian vulnerabilities, particularly in infrastructure and air defense, for each of them Iran needs to find a feasible solution to securely project its new role in the region.
Perhaps the most important question is who will manage regional security after the war. The United States has historically acted as the external custodian of the Persian Gulf security system. However, the war has undermined the proposition that American bases necessarily make their host countries safer. In fact, several Persian Gulf governments now increasingly view the U.S. military presence through a double lens: it provides protection, but it can also make them targets. This, at least, means that America's custodianship has become contestable. Iran, however, should not assume that the decline of American credibility automatically produces Iranian dominance. The emerging system may instead be characterized by multiple centers of coercive power.
Last but not least, the most consequential transformation is occurring inside Iran's own strategic thinking. For years, Iranian military strategy was largely reactive: respond to Israeli strikes, deter American intervention, support partners, and preserve strategic depth. The new environment encourages a different logic. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to strike directly at the military infrastructure supporting an attack against it. This represents a movement from deterrence by retaliation toward deterrence through proactive risk creation. Iran's strongest strategic position would be one in which its adversaries understand that aggression against Iran will impose unacceptable costs, while its neighbors simultaneously understand that Iranian power does not necessarily threaten their economic survival. Tehran must now construct that difficult balance.
In the end, the new architecture Iran should seek is not a revised version of the old order but a regional and peaceful security complex rooted in shared economic profit. It would require an Iran that is unsanctioned and able to participate fully in the region's economic life; Arab states that are unthreatened by Israel and free to pursue their own security and development; and Arab countries that are unexploited by great powers. Only such a settlement can transform the war's strategic upheaval into a durable order in which Iranian security, Arab autonomy, and regional prosperity reinforce one another rather than remain permanently opposed.
source: tehrantimes.com