Irans longrange blows against US are economic not military
Iran’s long-range blows against US are economic, not military
TEHRAN - In many wars, the first reactions appear on the battlefield. The deeper consequences, however, tend to surface in markets, supply chains and the strategic calculations of governments. The recent confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other was initially portrayed as a rapid and limited military clash. Yet growing signs suggest that the crisis could evolve into a far more consequential test — not only for the global economy, but for the stability of the international order itself.
War economies typically unfold in two stages. The first is immediate and short?term, when markets react sharply: energy prices spike, panic buying accelerates and investors search for safe havens. The second stage, emerging over the medium term, raises a more decisive question: whether the parties involved are actually prepared for a prolonged conflict. At that point, what matters is not simply firepower but economic endurance, social resilience and the capacity to adapt to sustained disruption.
Iran and its adversaries appear to have entered the confrontation with very different assumptions. Years of sanctions and external pressure have forced Iran to adapt to conditions of economic stress, pushing policymakers toward stockpiling essential goods, managing consumption, expanding social support and preparing for sudden shocks. In contrast, many official statements in Washington and Tel Aviv suggested expectations of a limited and relatively brief operation, rather than a conflict that could stretch on for weeks or months and disrupt the world’s energy arteries.
At the center of this crisis lies the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow passage whose importance is often summarized with a single statistic: that roughly 20 percent of the world’s energy supply passes through it. Yet this shorthand does not tell the whole story. The crucial issue is not simply global oil production but the share of oil and gas actually traded on international markets. The world produces more than 100 million barrels of oil and condensates each day, but a substantial portion is consumed domestically within producing countries. What shapes global markets is traded oil. From that perspective, the roughly 20 million barrels that move through the Strait of Hormuz each day carry far greater weight. If that route were seriously disrupted, the pressure would fall not merely on a fifth of the world’s energy supply but on close to half of the oil circulating between producing and consuming nations.
Moreover, the world’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is not limited to crude oil. Gas condensates, liquefied natural gas, refined petroleum products, and part of the region’s mineral and petrochemical exports also move through this corridor. Under such conditions, any disruption in Hormuz would drive up not only oil prices, but also the cost of natural gas, refined fuels, shipping, industrial feedstocks and, ultimately, production across a wide range of sectors. Agriculture, steel, automobiles, chemicals and even food supply chains would all feel the effects, directly or indirectly.
One reason such a shock could prove both deep and lasting lies in the technical constraints of the global refining system. Nearly 700 refineries around the world have been designed and calibrated for specific grades of crude. Oil produced in the Persian Gulf differs from that of many other suppliers in API gravity, chemical composition and other technical characteristics. Refineries can, to a degree, adjust their feedstock through blending or operational changes. But such shifts are neither quick nor cheap, and they are not always economically viable. As a result, replacing Persian Gulf crude on a large scale — even if it appears feasible on paper — would in practice face serious constraints.
For that reason, if disruption in Hormuz were to last longer than a few days and extend into the medium term, the economic strain could spread rapidly from energy markets to the broader global economy. Energy remains a central component in the cost structure of goods and services. A sharp increase in oil and gas prices typically triggers a wave of inflation, raising costs for producers while eroding consumers’ purchasing power. For energy-importing economies, the shock is doubly painful: production becomes more expensive even as demand weakens.
For the United States, the situation may be more complicated than it first appears. Over the past decade, Washington has grappled with persistent trade deficits, significant dependence on imported industrial raw materials and a high level of public debt. In such conditions, a broad energy shock would not only increase import costs; by slowing global growth, it would also shrink export markets for American industrial and technology-intensive goods. Although the United States and its allies could draw on strategic petroleum reserves, that tool is useful only for managing a temporary interruption — not for offsetting a deep and prolonged disruption in one of the world’s most important energy arteries.
Releasing strategic petroleum reserves is not, however, a cost-free solution. Such a move may reassure markets in the short run, but if the crisis drags on, it can become a source of vulnerability in its own right. The lower those reserves fall, the thinner the energy security buffer for consuming nations becomes. That, in turn, may persuade markets that time is not working in favor of the coalition that had counted on a short war.
At stake here is not merely economics, but the broader relationship between economic stability and global power. The standing of the dollar and of American financial markets in the international system rests not only on Washington’s military reach, but also on confidence in the resilience of the U.S. economy and in its ability to absorb and manage global shocks. If a regional war can disrupt energy markets for an extended period, intensify global inflation and simultaneously raise America’s financial and social costs, then an old question will return with new urgency: Does the post-Cold War unipolar order retain its former solidity, or is the world moving more decisively toward a multipolar arrangement? The possibility that a form of calibrated disruption in the Persian Gulf could continue to target American commercial shipping even after the formal end of hostilities would only make the war’s consequences for the United States more prolonged — and potentially chronic.
On the military and political fronts, what makes this conflict especially difficult is the possibility that it may not end in any clear or rapid victory. The initial strikes, while shocking and costly, do not appear to have produced a decisive outcome. Iran, by contrast, has sought to rely on asymmetric instruments — pressure on maritime routes, missile and drone attacks, and efforts to widen the costs imposed on its adversaries — in order to transform the logic of the conflict from a purely military confrontation into a war of economic and strategic attrition.
From this perspective, an important question remains: Have all of the parties’ real capacities already been brought into play? Some analysts speak of a strategic stalemate, but the reality is that options for mutual escalation still exist — from wider disruption of maritime traffic to a more active role for aligned actors on other fronts, as well as intensified cyberattacks and strikes on infrastructure. At the same time, each of those options would heighten the risk of a broader regional crisis and make it more costly for all sides to contain.
For that reason, if the war continues, Washington’s most plausible objective may not be outright victory so much as a manageable exit — one that can prevent the crisis from hardening into a structural shock to the global economy without requiring an explicit admission of defeat. Yet any such arrangement, if it is to prove durable, would most likely require at least a minimal understanding with Iran: one that, from Tehran’s perspective, would have to include assurances against a rapid return to war, recognition of certain strategic red lines and some form of compensation for the costs already incurred.
In the end, the significance of this war may lie less in what is happening on the battlefield today than in what it reveals about the world to come. If the Strait of Hormuz becomes a sustained lever of pressure, if energy markets prove this vulnerable to a regional crisis, and if major powers appear unable to contain the economic fallout, then this will no longer be merely a regional conflict. It may come to mark a moment in which the fragility of the global economy, the limits of American power and the accelerating shift toward a more complex, more multipolar order are all exposed at once.
By Seyed Hamid Hosseini is the spokesperson for OPEX and Editor-in-Chief of Donya-ye Energy Magazine
Mehdi Hasanvand is Director of the Center for Sustainable Energy Development (PAYA)
Reza Mokhtar is a Senior Energy Researcher
source: tehrantimes.com