From Epic Fury to Tragic Scurry The spectacular folly of arrogant miscalculation
From ‘Epic Fury’ to ‘Tragic Scurry’: The spectacular folly of arrogant miscalculation
In February 2026, the United States and the Zionist regime, barely eight months after their aggression in June 2025, once again carried out unlawful and hostile attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran. These actions were undertaken under the pretext of “preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons,” despite the well-established fact that all of Iran’s nuclear activities and facilities remain fully subject to the monitoring, verification, and safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
During the recent war, the brave and steadfast Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran delivered decisive and consequential blows to the American and Israeli side. At the same time, the resolute, unified, and active presence of the great nation of Iran, in support of their country, government and armed forces, imposed even greater political and operational costs for Washington’s miscalculations.
Despite these evident failures, American officials have sought, as usual, to advance misleading narratives in an attempt to justify their act of aggression. In a recent statement, the President of the United States asserted that the decision to initiate the war was taken following consultations with several individuals, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
The recent statements made by Steve Witkoff, the senior negotiator of the United States, in an attempt to justify the attacks and to assert the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, are unfounded from both technical and legal perspectives and bear little relation to established realities. Such claims disregard the verifiable facts surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and fail to withstand even the most basic technical scrutiny.
Notably, a number of American non-proliferation experts have themselves dismissed these assertions as technically unsound and lacking credibility, with some openly ridiculing the claims. It is deeply regrettable that a senior representative of the president of the United States would advance such arguments while appearing to demonstrate a striking lack of familiarity with the fundamental technical principles and realities governing nuclear activities.
Steve Witkoff has also attempted, in relation to the recent Geneva negotiations, to present a distorted and misleading account of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s approach by making statements that are inconsistent with the actual course of events.
In reality, the negotiations were conducted strictly in an indirect format, facilitated through the professional and constructive mediation of Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, the Foreign Minister of Oman, who maintained continuous communication with both delegations throughout the process. The Omani mediator was fully informed of the substance, positions, and details of the discussions and served as the channel through which messages and proposals were exchanged between the two sides.
Steve Witkoff’s inaccurate statements and his depiction of the negotiation process as something other than what occurred have, in turn, underscored the prudence of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy of avoiding direct negotiations with the American side and of insisting upon the involvement of a neutral third-party. Witkoff’s misrepresentation of the facts, therefore, inadvertently demonstrated the necessity of third-party mediation to ensure the legitimacy, transparency, and integrity of any diplomatic engagement with the United States, while reinforcing Tehran’s position that direct negotiations would be both imprudent and untenable.
Following the conclusion of the latest round of Geneva negotiations, the Omani Foreign Minister issued a clarifying and authoritative statement, emphasizing that tangible progress had been achieved and that the negotiations were advancing toward a potential agreement. Remarkably, just one day prior to the U.S.-Israeli aggression, during a visit to the United States, the Omani official explicitly affirmed that an agreement was within reach, noting that Iran had demonstrated significant flexibility and was fully prepared to engage in serious discussions on all aspects of the nuclear issue.
These official declarations starkly contradict the misrepresentations propagated by Steve Witkoff, exposing his claims as baseless and misleading, and underscoring the constructive and earnest approach taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran throughout the negotiation process.
It is evident that the United States initiated this unlawful war without any legitimate justification, acting instead on the basis of whimsical decisions and political temptations of its president. The reports of the Director General of the IAEA—despite Iran’s reservation concerning certain language and nuances—have consistently underscored a fundamental reality: there is no indication of a nuclear weapons program in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and such a program does not exist.
Moreover, official assessments by the United States intelligence community over recent years have repeatedly confirmed the same conclusion, stating explicitly that Iran has no intention of developing nuclear weapons.
Accordingly, the notion of an “Iranian nuclear threat,” which has been invoked as the purported justification for this war, is rooted not in technical or intelligence realities but in a politically constructed narrative designed to purportedly legitimize acts of aggression.
Attacks targeting nuclear facilities represent a blatant violation of international law, as well as the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the IAEA. Beyond their legal implications, such actions deal a severe blow to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and undermine the integrity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The Islamic Republic of Iran has previously, repeatedly, and explicitly conveyed through official correspondence to the United Nations Security Council, and the IAEA that silence and inaction in the face of such aggressions would only embolden and encourage the aggressors. This underscored Tehran’s grave concerns that failure to uphold international norms and to hold aggressors accountable would undermine the very foundations of the international legal order.
The unlawful attacks of March 2026 against safeguarded nuclear facilities unequivocally confirm the validity of these warnings. The ensuing escalation has demonstrated, in stark terms, that disregard for such diplomatic appeals can precipitate further aggression and threaten international peace and security. The course of recent events thus proves Iran’s insistence that unchecked aggression would have profound and far-reaching consequences.
Attacking safeguarded nuclear facilities does not merely inflict harm upon the Islamic Republic of Iran; they strike directly at the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime, the NPT, and the IAEA safeguards system. States that are parties to these frameworks, while assuming specific obligations, do so with the expectation of exercising their inalienable rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under full legal and political protection.
The principle of the balance of rights and obligations forms the cornerstone of all legal frameworks. The current circumstances, however, reveal that this balance has been profoundly disrupted within the international non-proliferation architecture.
When the depositary of the NPT, acting under baseless pretexts, alongside a criminal regime that is not even a party to the NPT, attacks a State Party whose nuclear facilities are fully under the IAEA safeguards, the credibility of the treaty framework is irrevocably undermined.
This stark reality exposes the inability of the international system to safeguard the rights of NPT State Parties and to ensure the consistent application of the fundamental principles of international law. By failing to uphold its own legal and normative standards, the system demonstrates both its vulnerability to political manipulation and its insufficiency in providing the protections that are essential to maintaining international peace and security.
In June 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran, through formal submissions and repeated warnings to the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council, emphasized that inaction in the face of aggression would gravely undermine the credibility of the NPT and the Agency’s safeguards system.
The recurrence of these attacks in February-March 2026 starkly confirms the failure of the international community and the consequences of its deadly silence—a silence that has emboldened aggressors to carry out even more brazen violations.
This lawlessness, chaos, and crisis extending far beyond Iran serves as a stark warning to the so-called international community, the global non-proliferation regime, and the NPT: if existing legal and political mechanisms fail to uphold the fundamental principles of State sovereignty, protect the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and maintain the balance between rights and obligations, the integrity of the entire international nuclear non-proliferation regime—and the global confidence in it—will face a profound risk of collapse.
Following the attacks of June 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran, acting in good faith, pursued a path of constructive engagement with the IAEA. The Iranian Foreign Minister maintained direct and continuous contact with the Director General of the Agency, while several rounds of discussions were conducted at multiple levels throughout July and August 2025.
These sustained interactions culminated in the “Cairo Understanding”, reached between the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Director General, which the latter himself characterized as a significant and constructive step. From the outset, Iran made it unequivocally clear that any escalation or aggressive action would result in the termination of this understanding, a position that was explicitly communicated by the Iranian Foreign Minister.
Despite this demonstration of goodwill by the Islamic Republic of Iran and what was widely regarded as a significant step toward easing tensions, the Western parties chose to escalate pressure. In particular, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3), acting in alignment with the policies of the White House, formally and unlawfully activated the so-called “snapback” mechanism.
On the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran dispatched a high-level delegation to New York, carrying specific initiatives and proposals aimed at advancing toward a negotiated agreement.
During these engagements, negotiations were conducted with the European parties; however, the E3 —acting in complete disregard for Iran’s demonstrated goodwill and seriousness— insisted on escalating pressure and proceeded with the activation of the so-called “snapback” mechanism. This stance reflected a prioritization of political objectives over constructive diplomacy, undermining the opportunities for de-escalation.
In fact, the decision by the E3 to activate the “snapback” mechanism did not emerge from an independent strategic assessment, but from a policy process deeply aligned with the priorities and pressures of the United States and its broader geopolitical agenda. This step was taken despite ongoing diplomatic engagement with Iran and in the context of parallel pressure from Washington.
From a legal perspective, the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the so-called invocation of the “snapback” has been articulated consistently and emphatically by Iranian officials. The E3 lack any legal, political, or moral standing to invoke the dispute resolution provisions of the JCPOA and Resolution 2231, as they have themselves violated the JCPOA and the UNSCR 2231. Therefore, the E3 notification to trigger snapback is procedurally and legally flawed, null and void, and inconsistent with the text and intent of Resolution 2231 — particularly given the significant non-performance by the E3 themselves.
Subsequently, E3 also sought to escalate political pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran at the level of the IAEA Board of Governors. At the November 2025 meeting of the Board, a resolution was adopted that was drafted and advanced by the E3 and the United States. The resolution was politically motivated rather than grounded in technical or legal merit. This resolution was widely criticized by Iran and several other Member States as lacking a legitimate basis and as a political instrument of pressure rather than a technically justified measure.
Even in the aftermath of the attacks of June 2025 and notwithstanding the destructive and hostile actions of the E3 and the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently maintained its engagement with the IAEA and, in response to the Agency’s requests, granted full access to all nuclear facilities that had not been affected by the attacks. This sustained and significant cooperation enabled the completion of the Agency’s inspection program in Iran for 2025 and reflects Iran’s ongoing goodwill, responsible conduct and firm commitment to its obligations.
Regarding the facilities that had been subject to the attacks, the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly articulated its position through a logical and well-reasoned explanation. Emphasizing that, under conditions where the risk of renewed attacks persists and no guarantee exists to prevent further aggression, providing access to these facilities are neither legally justified nor practically feasible. The fulfilment of safeguards obligations at such sites requires the presence of minimum safety and security conditions, which were not met in the aftermath of the attacks and amid ongoing threats. Consequently, access to such facilities and the related nuclear materials has been impossible for Iran, given the serious security and practical risks involved.
Eight months following the attacks of June 2025, the aggressors once again targeted safeguarded nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These unlawful actions have not only posed a grave threat to Iran’s national interests and security but have also exposed the inadequacy of the existing non-proliferation regime in safeguarding the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the protection of safeguarded nuclear facilities.
In light of these circumstances, the main question is whether or not existing international mechanisms can ensure minimum protections for the rights and security of a committed State Party, and what the upcoming NPT Review Conference can say about the usefulness of being a State Party to the NPT.
source: tehrantimes.com